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The Promised End - Physician-Assisted Suicide
And Abortion*
George J. Annas**
The debate over late term intact dilation and evacuation abor-
tions (so-called "partial birth" abortions) has been an uncomfort-
able one for those in the pro-choice community.' Although the
United States Senate narrowly refused to override President
Clinton's veto of a bill criminalizing this procedure, many in Con-
gress agreed with Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
that it was "as close to infanticide as anything I have come
upon."2 States have a compelling interest in preventing infanti-
cide that is not contradicted by a woman's constitutional right to
decide whether to continue a pregnancy. Similarly, states have a
legitimate and perhaps even compelling interest in suicide pre-
vention that is not contradicted by an individual's constitutional
right to refuse any medical treatment, even life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.
Making decisions at the beginning and end of life can be life-
defining, and individuals should have great discretion in such
matters. Beginnings and endings are not the same, however,
and the constitutional rights applicable to decision making about
reproduction are not likely to be easily transposed to decisions
individuals make at or near the end of their lives. Society has
reached constitutional consensus that women have a strong "lib-
erty" interest in deciding whether to continue a pregnancy, and a
state cannot "unduly burden" a woman's right to decide prior to
* This article is an expanded version of The Promised End -Constitutional
Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 683 (1996).
** Edward R. Utley Professor and Chair of the Health Law Department, and
Founder of the Law, Medicine and Ethics Program, Boston University Schools of Public
Health and Medicine; A.B. Harvard College, 1967; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1970;
M.P.H. Harvard School of Public Health, 1972.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda and David Brown, Harsh Details Shift Tenor Abor-
tion Fight: Both Sides Bend Facts on Late-Term Procedure, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 17,
1996, at Al, A8; Melinda Henneberger, Both Sides in Debate on Late-Term Abortions
Duel on Eve of Contested Vote in House, N.Y. TudEs, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al, B12.
2. Vobejda and Brown, supra note 1, at A18.
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fetal viability.3 One recurring question in the current debate
about "physician-assisted suicide" concerns the relevance that
this constitutional abortion consensus has to the suicide debate.'
Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to review two
cases on this subject, the issue becomes even more important.
This brief article explores the relationship between abortion and
suicide rights in the context of the Ninth and Second Circuit
cases currently before the Supreme Court.'
I. THE OPINION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
The Ninth Circuit adopted the term "physician-assisted sui-
cide" to describe "the prescription of life-ending medication for
use by terminally ill, competent adult patients who wish to
hasten their deaths."6 The court, however, was not pleased with
this characterization, noting: "We have serious doubts that the
terms 'suicide' and 'assisted suicide' are appropriate legal
descriptions of the specific conduct at issue here."7 Instead of
simply ruling that the assisted suicide laws do not apply to pre-
scriptions of potentially lethal drugs, or sending the case to the
Supreme Court of Washington for an opinion on this question,
the court's ambitious eight to three opinion, written by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, relied on a substantive due process approach
creating a new constitutional right: the right to determine "the
time and manner of one's own death.""
Although this new right is broadly worded, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that only a narrow category of patients may lawfully exer-
cise it; namely, competent, terminally ill adults who have "lived
nearly a full measure" of life and who want to die with dignity.9
For such patients, "racked by pain and deprived of all pleasure, a
3. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. The most complete discussion of this issue to date is by Seth F. Kreimer, Does
Pro-choice mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 803 (1995). See also Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Con-
stitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REv. 292 (1996) and SuSAN M. WOLF, PHYsI-
CIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE, ABORTION, AND TREATMENT REFusAL: USING GENDER TO ANALYZE
THE DIFFERENCE (Robert Weir, ed.), Susan M. Wolf, PHYSIcIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE, INDIANA
U. PRESS, Bloomington, Indiana (forthcoming).
5. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) cert. granted,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110); Quill v.
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 1996) cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S.
Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858). See also George J. Annas, The 'Right to Die' in America:
Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 875,
892-97 (1996).
6. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798.
7. Id. at 802.
8. Id. at 793.
9. Id. at 814. Apparently, this constitutional class is to be defined by physicians.
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state-enforced prohibition on hastening their deaths condemns
these patients to unrelieved misery or torture."10 Surely, the
court concluded, choosing "whether to endure or avoid such an
existence" is a liberty interest every bit as vital as that involved
in a woman's decision whether to proceed with a pregnancy." As
the court stated, "[llike the decision of whether or not to have an
abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of 'the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a
choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy.'" 2 The
strength of this analogy is considered in a latter portion of this
article.
The second analogy upon which the Ninth Circuit relied con-
cerned the removal of feeding tubes. The United States Supreme
Court had agreed that there was a liberty interest in "refusing
unwanted medical treatment" in the case of Nancy Cruzan, a
young woman in a persistent vegetative state whose family
sought to have the administration of a feeding tube discontinued
on her behalf.'3 Since Nancy Cruzan would die without a feeding
tube, the Ninth Circuit characterized the decision in Cruzan as
having "necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in hastening
one's own death," thus permitting "suicide by starvation." 4 The
Ninth Circuit. recognized that, "as part of the tradition of
administering comfort care, doctors have been supplying the
causal agent of patients' deaths for decades," and understood
that physicians have justified this prescribing pattern on the
basis of its "double effect - reduce the patient's pain and hasten
[his or her] death." 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected the double-effect
rationale, however, stating, "[wie see little, if any, difference for
constitutional or ethical purposes between providing medication
with a double effect and providing medication with a single effect
... [or] between a doctor's pulling the plug on a respirator and
... prescribing drugs which will permit a terminally ill patient to
end [his or her] own life."' 6
10. Id.
11. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814.
12. Id. at 813-14. The court also quotes Casey's language on family and reproduc-
tive matters: "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
13. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). This case is
discussed in detail in GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN
BIOETHIcs 85-97, Oxford U. Press, NY, 1993.
14. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
15. Id. at 823.
16. Id. at 824.
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Having defined this new constitutional right, the only remain-
ing question is whether states have a sufficient interest to pro-
hibit its exercise. The court concluded that states do not have
such an interest and held that, "[wihen patients are no longer
able to pursue liberty or happiness and do not wish to pursue life,
the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is clearly less
[than] compelling.' 7 The court did, however, call on states to
regulate the practice of assisted suicide by suggesting procedural
safeguards such as witnesses, waiting periods, second medical
opinions, psychological examinations and reporting procedures.
Regulation of physician-assisted suicide is necessary, the court
posited, to help avoid "abuse." 8
II. THE OPINION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion, the Second
Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's substantive due process anal-
ysis as a defensible way to discover a new constitutional right.
The court concluded: "The right to assisted suicide finds no cog-
nizable basis in the Constitution's language or design, even in
the very limited cases of those competent persons who, in the
final stages of terminal illness, seek the right to hasten death."19
The Second Circuit instead found a constitutional right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause requires
states to treat individuals who are similarly situated in a similar
manner. Although this is superficially a different constitutional
approach from the Ninth Circuit's approach, the Second Circuit
was also required to discover a new constitutional right before
the court could conclude that the right to physician-assisted sui-
cide was unequally protected by the state.
The Second Circuit found that an individual has the right to
physician-assisted suicide through employment of two related
assertions: first, the right to refuse treatment is the same as the
right to "hasten death;" and second, there is no distinction
between a person dependent on life-support equipment and one
who is not.2" Both assertions are problematic. With regard to
the first assertion, the court opined that New York treated simi-
larly situated individuals unequally because the New York stat-
ute permitted individuals "in the final stages of terminal illness
who are on life support systems..." to hasten their deaths "by
17. Id. at 820.
18. Id. at 826.
19. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25.
20. Id. at 729.
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directing the removal of such systems," but those not receiving
life support could hasten their deaths "by self-administering pre-
scription drugs."2 ' The primary cases used by the court in sup-
port of this proposition were Cruzan22 and Eichner,23 even
though the two patients involved in those cases were neither ter-
minally ill nor expressed any desire to commit suicide despite the
fact that both patients were in persistent vegetative states. The
patient in the Eichner case was Brother Joseph Fox, an elderly
Catholic brother of the Society of Mary, who before hernia sur-
gery told his friend, Father Phillip Eichner, "[i]f I wind up like
Karen Quinlan pull the plug."24 Brother Fox would probably
have been horrified at the notion that his refusal of a ventilator
constituted suicide since suicide is a mortal sin in the Catholic
Church. As both Eichner and Cruzan make clear, the right at
issue is the right to refuse medical treatment (even if refusal
results in death), and individuals are not legally required to be
either terminally ill or in pain to exercise this right. Americans
have never been obligated to accept any or all manner of medical
treatment available to prolong life; the essence of the legal right
at issue is the right to be free from unwanted bodily invasions.2 5
Even more striking is the court's second assertion which is
based on Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring opinion in the
Cruzan case.2' Scalia argued in Cruzan that deaths resulting
from refusals of treatment are suicides, and any notion that the
patient dies a "natural" death from the underlying disease is
nonsense.27 The Second Circuit adopted Justice Scalia's position,
concluding that death after the removal of a ventilator is "not
natural in any sense;" rather removal of a ventilator brings about
"death through asphyxiation."2 The Second Circuit also stated
that the removal of artificially delivered fluids and nutrition
causes "death by starvation ... or dehydration."2 As the court
stated, "[t]he ending of life by these means is nothing more nor
less than assisted suicide."30 Here the court applies the philo-
21. Id. Of course, people who require medical life-support equipment to live are
substantially different from people who do not require such equipment.
22. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
23. Matter of Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
24. Id. This case is discussed in detail in GEORGE J. ANNAs, JUDGING MEDICINE
273-284, Humana, Toyota NJ, 1988.
25. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, ThE RiGHTs OF PATIENTS, 2d ed., So. Ill. U.
Press, Carbondale, Ill., 1989.
26. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 292. It should be noted that no other Justice on the Court
joined in Scalia's concurrence.
27. Id. at 296-97.





sophical argument that all things being equal, there is no moral
distinction between an act and an omission to act 3' to a situation
where all things are not equal, especially duty, consent and
intent.
The Second Circuit concluded that since both refusing treat-
ment and taking lethal drugs constitute suicide, providing citi-
zens equal protection under the law requires states to treat both
acts in a similar manner. The court argued that since doctors are
permitted to "assist" patients being sustained by various life-sup-
port mechanisms to commit suicide by removing the support,
patients who do not need medical interventions to continue to
live should also be entitled to the assistance of a physician in
committing suicide.32 As to the states' possible interest in distin-
guishing between these acts, the court concluded that states
have no interest "in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all
but ended."33 The court continued, stating, "[w]hat business is it
of the state to require the continuation of agony when the result
is imminent and inevitable?"34 The court did not contemplate
that it was giving physicians a new license to kill since it con-
cluded, "physicians do not fulfill the role of 'killer' by prescribing
drugs to hasten death any more than they do by disconnecting
life support systems."3 5 The court did, however, specifically reject
euthanasia, distinguishing it from assisted suicide, stating: "In
euthanasia one causes the death of another by direct and inten-
tional acts ... [e]uthanasia falls within the definition of murder
in New York."
3 6
III. DISTINGUISHING GOOD SUICIDES FROM BAD
The ability to distinguish objectively between "good" and "bad"
suicides is critical since the protection of vulnerable individuals
from abuse (i.e., avoiding the slippery slope) is the most impor-
tant state interest in prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.
Society certainly has a compelling interest in preventing individ-
uals from jumping off of bridges or buildings, for example, and it
would be strange to view such acts as constitutionally protected.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
34. Id. at 730.
35. Id.
36. Id. at n.3. The opinion concludes with the holding: The New York statutes
criminalizing assisted suicide violate the Equal Protection Clause because, to the extent
that they prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a
mentally competent, terminally-ill person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they
are not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
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The Ninth Circuit overruled a 1995 decision by the same circuit
in which Judge John Noonan, writing for a two-to-one panel, con-
cluded that any attempt to define the category of constitutionally
protected assisted suicides is "inherently unstable," and any
right to assisted suicide would ultimately have to be available to
all adults. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's 1996 decision in
Compassion in Dying, decided by a larger panel of eleven judges,
concluded that doctors can accurately distinguish "worthy" sui-
cides from "unworthy" and "irrational" suicides. The court
stated:
One of the heartaches of suicide is the senseless loss of a life ended
prematurely. In the case of a terminally ill adult who ends his life in
the final stages of an incurable and painful degenerative disease, in
order to avoid debilitating pain and a humiliating death, the decision
to commit suicide is not senseless, and death does not come too early.
Unlike the depressed twenty-one year old, the romantically-devas-
tated twenty-eight year old, the alcoholic forty-year-old... a termi-
nally ill competent adult cannot be cured . . . [but] can only be
maintained in a debilitated and deteriorating state, unable to enjoy
the presence of family or friends.
38
The court found that frustrating the wishes of terminally ill
patients is "cruel indeed," and quoted Kent's lines from King
Lear, spoken immediately after Lear dies, to buttress its argu-
ment: "Vex not his ghost: 0! let him pass; he hates him/That
would upon the rack of this tough world/Stretch him out
longer."3 9 Courts rarely resort to quoting literature, and when
they do, it is usually because there is no legal argument to sup-
port the court's conclusion. That may be true in this instance,
and the court's misreading of King Lear only serves to emphasize
how difficult it is to draw lines or make objective assessments
when dealing with suicide. Thus, the court's seemingly marginal
use of a quotation turns out to be central to understanding the
entire opinion. Lear did not die because he was terminally ill or
in severe pain. Rather, Lear is much more like the person who
dies because of a personal emotional tragedy. In Lear's case, the
King had just learned that his one faithful and loving daughter,
37. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd en banc
79 F.3d 790 (1996).
38. Id. at 820-21.
39. The court obtained this quotation from Judge Posner's book on passage, AGE
AND OLD AGE 239 (1995), and there is at least some irony in taking this particular quote
from Posner since Posner himself is one of the harshest critics of the "law and literature"
field. See RicHARD POSNER, LAw & LrrERATuRE (1991). Moreover, as the court later con-
cedes, Posner himself rejects the idea that there is any constitutional right to assisted
suicide, and argues that this morally contentious issue should be decided by the state
legislatures. Of course, Posner thinks the same thing about abortion and has consistently
deplored Roe v. Wade.
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Cordelia, had been murdered, and he had just uttered his famous
line over Cordelia's dead body: "Why should a dog, a horse, a rat,
have life,/and thou no breath at all?" Earlier that same day, Lear
was prepared to spend many years in prison with Cordelia. After
Cordelia's murder, however, Lear dies of a broken heart. There
is no suicide and no assistance; instead (to the contemporary
reader) Kent acts as Lear's health care agent and exercises
Lear's right to refuse treatment by ordering that resuscitation
not be attempted. Extending the court's literary metaphor, it is
clear that no legal changes are needed to protect the right of
someone in Lear's position to refuse treatment.
IV. ABORTION AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
Just as the Ninth Circuit quoted a line out of context from
King Lear, the court also took a line out of context from Casey,
the Supreme Court decision reaffirming abortion rights, to pro-
vide the basis for a new constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide.4" There are, however, striking similarities between
abortion and assisted suicide. The most notable, perhaps, is the
tendency of proponents and opponents of both practices to use
overblown language that obscures rather than clarifies the prac-
tices. In the abortion debate, opponents use words such as "kill-
ing babies," "murder" and "right to life." Similarly overblown
language is used by opponents of physician-assisted suicide.4'
Proponents adopt "pro-choice" rhetoric to support assisted sui-
cide, using words such as "personal choice," "liberty" and "con-
trol" over an individual's life to express their view. The truth of
the matter is, of course, much different than the slogans are able
to portray. Moreover, in the context of abortion and physician-
assisted suicide, notions of control and choice are either illusory
or incredibly limited. Another striking image is the use of the
concept of suffering, used in both instances by individuals debat-
ing either abortion or physician-assisted suicide. Anti-abortion-
ists tend to concentrate on the suffering of the fetus, whereas the
proponents of physician-assisted suicide focus on the suffering of
the terminally ill individual. Religion and religious beliefs also
play a major role in both debates. Our challenge is to move
beyond the sloganeering and endeavor to understand the real dif-
ferences between the two issues and their relevance to constitu-
tional analysis.
40. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), discussed in more detail in
George J. Annas, The Supreme Court, Liberty, and Abortion, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 651
(1992).
41. See, e.g., sources cited supra in note 1.
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The primary difference between abortion and physician-
assisted suicide is the definition of the constitutional right
involved. The constitutional right involved in abortion is the
right to decide whether to continue a pregnancy. In contrast,
although suicide has been decriminalized, there is no constitu-
tional right to commit suicide. Indeed, it would be difficult to
envision how such a right would be defined. Perhaps this is why
neither the Ninth nor Second Circuit discussed a "right to sui-
cide." Instead, both courts used phrases such as "a right to
hasten death" and "a right to determine the time and manner of
death."42 The former term is so vague that it renders itself mean-
ingless (could we be talking about the "right to smoke?"), while
the latter term is so over-inclusive it also renders itself meaning-
less (can I decide to be immortal or to die in my sleep?). This
discussion is important, because as the opinion in Casey teaches,
the right of a physician to perform an abortion is entirely deriva-
tive from the right of the pregnant woman to have an abortion.
If there is no constitutional right to commit suicide, there can be
no constitutional right to have a physician assist an individual to
commit suicide. As this discussion implies, the role of the physi-
cian is a closely-related issue. As abortion endangers the life and
health of women if performed by themselves or by unlicensed or
"back alley" practitioners, the state has a sufficiently compelling
interest in protecting women's health to require that only
licensed physicians be permitted to perform abortions." No such
rationale exists regarding suicide. Almost all competent adults
are capable of successfully committing suicide and tens of
thousands do so every year.45 Suicide is not a medical procedure
and there is no health or safety reason mandating a physician's
involvement in an individual's suicide. As the Supreme Court
noted in Roe, "pregnancy may come more than once" and usually
does; the decision about abortion may thus be repeated.46 Sui-
42. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 739; Quill, 80 F.3d at 716, 721.
43. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 852. In great contrast, most of the debate on
physician-assisted suicide centers on expanding the power of physicians to perform new
acts (such as prescribing lethal medication) with immunity. In this sense it is more about
physician power than patient rights.
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. The latest statistics available on this are for 1991, a year in which there were
30,810 suicides of which 73% were white males; 60% of all suicides were committed with
a firearm (18,500), almost all by males. Males are four times more likely to die of suicide
than females, and people living in a household with a firearm are five times more likely to
die of suicide than those who do not. More people commit suicide with a firearm than are
killed by another person (18,000 firearm homicides) with a firearm. NATIONAL CENTER
FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
INJURY CONTROL-SUICIDE, March 9, 1995.
46. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125.
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cide cannot be repeated; it ends all possibility of liberty rather
than enhancing it. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recognized
that physicians need not be involved in the final act by extending
immunity to family members and others.47 Moreover, abortion is
performed in the context of a confidential doctor-patient relation-
ship without direct state or third party interference or review.'
All proposals to "legalize" physician-assisted suicide would cor-
rupt the doctor-patient relationship by requiring some form of
outside review or consultation with one or more other physicians.
Requirements of multiple physician review were explicitly found
by the United States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional in
the context of abortion.49
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide argue that even if sui-
cide is not a medical procedure, physicians should be involved
because they can inform the patient of medical options and can
prescribe or administer painless and effective drugs.50 Neither
argument, however, is persuasive. Physicians can inform
patients of the available options without assisting patients in
suicide, and drugs that can end life are readily available in this
country. Moreover, to the extent that an individual believes ter-
minally ill patients should be exempted from the prohibition on
the use of dangerous drugs, terminally ill patients who want to
use dangerous drugs in order to survive should, as a matter of
equal protection, have at least as much of a right to access these
drugs as individuals who want to use them to kill themselves.
This is because the state must have at least as much of an inter-
est in helping an individual to live who wants to live as it does in
helping an individual to die who wants to die.51 There is little
doubt, nonetheless, as to the constitutionality of laws forbidding
anyone, including the terminally ill, from accessing schedule I
drugs given the state's compelling interest in preventing drug
abuse.52
A related set of considerations in this debate involves the basis
for the constitutional right at issue. To the extent that both
abortion and physician-assisted suicide are asserted to be "lib-
47. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838 n. 140.
48. Daniel Callahan and Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RicHmoND L. REv. 1 & 8-9 (1996);
George J. Annas et al., The Right of Privacy Protects the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 263
JAMA 858 (1990).
49. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
50. See, e.g., DEREK HuMPHREY, F NAL Exrr (1991).
51. ANNAs, supra note 24.
52. Even questionable searches to determine drug use have been found constitu-
tional by the Court. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 656
(1989), and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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erty" rights grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the parallel between the two holds. No such
parallel exists, however, under an Equal Protection analysis.
Abortion applies only to women, and pregnancy itself is sui
generis. In this respect, abortion does not parallel suicide since
there is no issue of gender equality involved in suicide.5 3 Simi-
larly, the right to terminate a pregnancy is limited to a narrow
and easily defined class of people, namely, pregnant women.5 4 As
discussed above, however, there is no bright line limiting the cat-
egory of people to whom a right to commit suicide (or to receive
assistance in suicide) applies. Finally, abortion can correctly be
viewed as a method of returning the woman to the status quo
ante (i.e., not pregnant) to continue her life, whereas suicide, of
course, ends an individual's life.55 A final distinction, seldom
directly confronted in the abortion debate, concerns what is being
killed. The notion that purposely killing an embryo or nonviable
fetus is "murder" lies at the heart of abortion as social policy and
as a political and religious issue. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has consistently and unanimously ruled that a
fetus does not become a "person" for constitutional purposes until
birth, although it is so similar to a person at viability that the
state has a compelling interest in protecting fetal life after viabil-
ity. This is what makes "near birth" feticide so problematic.
What is killed in pregnancy termination is human and alive but,
constitutionally speaking, is a non-person. On the other hand,
the entity killed in physician-assisted suicide is always a person
for constitutional purposes.56 States undoubtedly have a compel-
ling interest in protecting the lives of all persons, including those
who are suffering and near the end of life. This state interest,
like the interest in prohibiting the use of dangerous drugs, may
not be directed at the individual alone; rather, it may be asserted
to protect other similarly situated individuals whose lives might
be put at risk by permitting physician-assisted suicide.
53. See generally WoLF, supra note 4 and KREIMER supra note 4.
54. CALLAnAN & WHmrE, supra note 47.
55. WOLF, supra note 4. In Wolfs words:
... assisted suicide removes nothing from the body and restores no status quo ante.
It intervenes to change the life course radically. There is a potential for confusion
here. Certainly both abortion and treatment refusal can require a second bodily
invasion - the doctor may have to enter the body to remove the fetus or the feeding
tube. This is no surprise. The body is complex and removing something may
require skillful entry and exit, as well as control of associated symptoms. Yet the
fact that abortion and treatment refusal may require invasion does not alter the
point of all this activity - removal of something from the body. This is not the case
in assisted suicide. No primary invasion is being removed when the physician sup-
plies the means of bodily invasion for suicide.
Id.
56. See generally, KREIMER, supra note 4.
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Reliance on Cruzan is also problematic. Cruzan involved the
right to refuse treatment, not the right to "hasten death." Our
notion of "liberty" demands that individuals be able to resist
unwanted bodily intrusions. This notion does not encompass
demands for specific types of intrusions or interventions.
Neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the United States
Supreme Court viewed a refusal of artificial fluids and nutrition
by Nancy Cruzan, or her parents on Nancy's behalf, as a possible
violation of Missouri's law against assisted suicide. 7
V. PHYSICIANS AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
The patients whose cases were presented to the Ninth and Sec-
ond Circuits, of which three were dying of AIDS, two of cancer
and one of emphysema, are all deserving of sympathy. It is not
surprising, then, that the courts wanted to help them. Cancer
and AIDS often lead to "hard deaths,"5 8 and patients dying of
these two diseases make up the vast majority of patients in hos-
pices as well as the majority of those who seek the assistance of
physicians in committing suicide.5 9 This is likely because the
final stages of both cancer and AIDS are relatively predictable.
Surprisingly, the Ninth and Second Circuits failed to acknowl-
edge explicitly that it has never been illegal to prescribe pain
medication that competent terminally ill patients might use to
commit suicide as long as the drugs have legitimate independent
medical value, and the physicians' intent is to foster the patients'
well-being by giving them more control over their life.60 Prescrip-
tions of these drugs can legitimately be viewed as suicide preven-
tion rather than suicide assistance. Neither court could cite to a
single case of a physician being criminally prosecuted for the con-
duct of which they approve, and both courts would have been on
much stronger ground if they had simply acknowledged that
intent is relevant in criminal law and that prescriptions under
these very limited circumstances are not assisted suicide by defi-
nition.6' In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit's
restatement of the principle of the double effect, which treats
57. See supra note 13.
58. Id.
59. SusAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1988).
60. Thomas Preston and Ralph Mero, Observations Concerning Terminally Ill
Patients Who Choose Suicide, 4 J. PlHAm. CARE PAIN SYMPrOM CONTROL 183 (1996); and
RUSSELL OGDEN, EuTrnHNASIA, ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND ADs (1994). The issue of AIDS and
suicide has become much more complex with the introduction of a new class of drugs, the
protease inhibitors, which may permit individuals to live for decades with HIV infection.
61. George J. Annas, Death by Prescription - The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1240 (1994).
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pain relief and death as equally intended, is false. The principle
correctly states that treating a patient's pain is acceptable even if
the treatment hastens death, which it will not, of course, always
do. Providing medication to control pain has always been a legit-
imate and lawful medical act even if death or suicide is risked.2
There is a difference between an intended result and an unin-
tended, accepted consequence. Thus, no physician should con-
clude on the basis of the Ninth Circuit opinion that providing
pain medication that increases the risk of death is either assist-
ance in suicide or is homicide. As Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew
Kleinfeld properly notes in dissent, when General Dwight D.
Eisenhower ordered American troops to the beaches in Nor-
mandy, he knew he was sending many to certain death, but his
purpose was to liberate Europe from the Nazis. Judge Kleinfeld
continued, "[t]he majority's theory of ethics would imply that this
purpose was legally and ethically indistinguishable from a pur-
pose of killing American soldiers."
63
It is impossible to accept either courts' logic about the cause of
death after refusal of treatment. If one accepts that Nancy
Cruzan "died of starvation" and not from the vegetative condition
that made continued artificial feeding necessary for her survival,
one must also accept the conclusion that when physicians stop
attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation on a patient in cardiac
arrest, what kills the patient is not the arrest but the physician
who intentionally stops compressing the heart. Since failure to
perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation always "hastens death,"
employment of both courts' logic leads to the conclusion that
patients who refuse cardiopulmonary resuscitation would always
be committing suicide. Correspondingly, doctors who write do-
not-resuscitate orders would always be assisting the patient's
suicide. The failure to distinguish real causes of death from vari-
ous medical tools and techniques that temporarily substitute for
particular bodily functions is fatal to the logic of both opinions.
Since the vast majority of deaths in hospitals occur after some
medical intervention is refused or deemed useless, under the
courts' logic there is an epidemic of suicide and homicide in the
nation's hospitals. Such a conclusion is patently absurd.
This logical failure helps explain why neither court could
define the right it discovered. Flawed logic also aids in explain-
62. Id.; Norman Cantor and G. Thomas, Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and
Criminal Law, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETmIcs J. 107 (1996)
63. Id. It is no more a form of assisted suicide to take the risk that your patient
may die by overdose than it is a form of homicide to take a risk that your surgical patient
may die from complications of surgery on the operating table. Intent and causation both
matter in the criminal law.
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ing the courts' inability to persuasively limit exercise of the right
to cases involving prescriptions written by physicians for compe-
tent, terminally ill patients; limitations that have no basis in
constitutional law.64 Cruzan and Eichner, after all, support the
proposition that the right to refuse treatment is not lost by
incompetence but can be exercised in advance by means of a liv-
ing will or the designation of a health care proxy. Also, these
cases make clear that an adult need not be terminally ill to
refuse treatment. Of course, one cannot commit suicide by proxy.
On the other hand, nothing in the logic of these opinions would
prohibit physicians from actually injecting lethal doses into
patients who met the other criteria and were unable to commit
suicide themselves, although this practice was explicitly prohib-
ited by the Second Circuit. The Ninth Circuit also explicitly pro-
tected family and friends working under direction of a physician
from criminal prosecution, but never explained why either a phy-
sician or a prescription drug is constitutionally required. For
example, neither court suggested any reason why a physician
could not recommend suicide by gun and instruct a patient or
family member about where to aim the gun before the patient
pulled the trigger. The group of covered patients may encompass
those capable of living for years (like Lear), but whose lives no
longer bring them joy or happiness, since both the Ninth and
Second Circuits admitted that there is not a constitutional defini-
tion of terminal illness. Certainly, terminal illness appears to
include early HIV infection, Alzheimer's disease and cancer. To
the extent that states have an interest in protecting individuals
suffering from such illness from physicians (and others) who
might encourage suicide for reasons other than to relieve pain or
suffering at the end of life, these opinions cannot prevent a slide
down the slippery slope.
VI. STATE REGULATIONS
Perhaps recognizing this weakness in their analyses, both the
Ninth and Second Circuits call for states to regulate physician-
assisted suicide. The Ninth Circuit, interestingly, approved Ore-
gon Ballot Measure 16, which provides legal immunity to physi-
cians who follow certain procedures when prescribing lethal
drugs to terminally ill patients with the intent that the patients
use the drugs to commit suicide. 5 State regulations requiring
64. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 858; Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide
- Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DETROrr L. REv. 735 (1995).
65. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 858; Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or.
1995). See also ANiAs, supra note 59.
196 Vol. 35:183
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Abortion
protections such as second opinions and reporting would remove,
however, decision making power from doctors and their
patients.6 Moreover, if one agrees with the Second Circuit's
analysis of Equal Protection, states are permitted to adopt iden-
tical or substantially similar regulations for refusals of treat-
ment that "hasten death" as for physician-assisted suicide. If
states adopt such regulations, the hard-won rights that the great
majority of patients can and do now exercise to refuse medical
treatments are put at risk since mandatory procedural safe-
guards can be extremely burdensome to both patients and their
families, and can actually serve to frustrate rather than foster
patient self-determination.67
The Ninth and Second Circuit opinions can also be read as
undercutting all laws relating to schedule I drugs as well as reg-
ulation of medical experimentation, at least with regard to
patients near the end of life. If laws against assisted suicide are
unconstitutional because they deprive terminally ill patients of
relief from suffering, how can laws that restrict an individual's
access to heroin or LSD be constitutional?68 Contrary to the
actions of these courts, the Supreme Court has previously and
unanimously endorsed the view of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration that drug laws requiring demonstrated safety and effi-
cacy forbid everyone, including the terminally ill, to obtain
unapproved drugs.
6 9
The opinions of the two appellate courts have garnered much
editorial support in the press because they seem to expand
patients' autonomy by giving them another choice. In fact, how-
ever, by equating the refusal of treatment with suicide, the opin-
ions may actually reduce patients' rights by encouraging state
governments to regulate patients' refusals of treatment that
might "hasten death." For those who believe that when physi-
cians honor treatment refusals they are routinely engaging in
assisted suicide and homicide, these opinions mark an advance
in protection for patients. The opinions do so, however, at the
cost of taking decision making away from doctors and their
patients, and entangling both in even more public and private
bureaucracy and scrutiny. Courts may see only doctors, patients,
and the criminal law, but physicians know that contemporary
medicine is much more complex, with the real power shifting
66. CALLAHAN & Wmr, supra note 47.
67. Susan Wolf, Holding the Line on Euthanasia, 19 HASTnGrS CENTER REPORT 13
(1989 Supp).
68. ANNAs, supra note 59.
69. U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
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rapidly from physicians to health plans.7 ° In this context both
physicians and patients need medical ethics (including informed
consent and the principle of the double effect) to mean more than
just immunity from criminal prosecution.
VII. CONCLUSION
By ignoring the past two decades of jurisprudence concerning
the right to refuse treatment (including the rulings by state
supreme courts explicitly holding refusals of treatment are
neither suicide nor homicide), 7' and by failing to make such ele-
mentary distinctions as those between the right to refuse treat-
ment and the "right to die," between suicide and assisted suicide,
between law and ethics, and between ends and means, the Ninth
and Second Circuits virtually guaranteed that their decisions
would not be the last word on the subject. Since states have a
legitimate interest in protecting all citizens, especially those who
are terminally ill and vulnerable, it seems almost certain that
the Supreme Court will ultimately uphold state laws making
assisted suicide a criminal act.72 The Court is also likely to per-
mit states to decriminalize physician-assisted suicide if they
desire because of its current stand on states' rights.
7 3
There are real problems with the way patients die under a
physician's care, often abandoned and in pain, and the Ninth and
Second Circuit rulings are important demonstrations of how a
large number of judges view dying at the hands of modern
medicine.74 On the other hand, a survey of patients with cancer
published after the Ninth and Second Circuit opinions were writ-
ten found that those who had seriously discussed suicide or
euthanasia, or who hoarded drugs, were more likely to be
depressed or have poor physical function than to be in significant
70. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy, Managed Care and Managed Death, 155 ARCH
INTERNAL MED. 133 (1995).
71. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996);
Leonard Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal
Law, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231 (1987-88).
72. NEW YORK TAsK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICME AN]) EUrHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994).
73. Charles Baron et al., Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARVARD J. LEGIS. 1 (1996).
74. The SUPPORT study, for example, found that the families of 50% of a sample
of patients who died in the hospital believed that the patients "experienced moderate or
severe pain at least half the time during their last 3 days of life." The SUPPORT Princi-
pal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized
Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of
Treatments, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
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pain.75 Obviously, society must understand patients' problems
before it can be sure that our solution to the problems will do
more good than harm.
Shakespeare changed the traditional ending of the legend on
which he based his King Lear play by having both Lear and
Cordelia die rather than restoring Lear to his throne and having
all live happily ever after. Shakespeare's ending fits well with
our post-modern intimations of disaster and apocalypse, just as
assisted suicide seems a reasonable way out of our inability to
control the decay of our bodies. Nonetheless, the more appropri-
ate lines from King Lear in this context may be the questions of
Kent and Edgar near the end of the play: "Is this the promised
end, [o]r image of that horror?"
75. E. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and
Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET 1805 (1996).
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